In 2013, He et al. proposed an improved password-based remote user authentication scheme without smart cards. He et al. claimed that their proposed scheme could withstand various cryptographical attacks. However, this paper points out that He et al.'s scheme is still vulnerable to impersonation attack unlike its claim. For this reason, He et al.'s scheme is insecure for practical application.
Introduction
Remote user authentication scheme is one of the fundamental procedures to ensure secure communications over an insecure public communication network channel [1, 2, 3] . Recently, Chen et al. [4] proposed a new secure passwordbased remote user authentication scheme without smart cards. The scheme adopts common storage devices such as USB storage drives [1] .
In 2013, He et al. [5] , however, showed that Chen et al.'s scheme not only is vulnerable to the device stolen attack and the privileged insider attack, but also does not support perfect forward secrecy and no key control. To enhancing the security and practicality, He et al. also proposed an improved scheme to overcome weaknesses and maintain the benefits of the original scheme.
Although He et al.'s authentication scheme has many benefits. The scheme is still vulnerable to the impersonation attack. Therefore, this paper points out that He et al.'s scheme is still vulnerable to impersonation attack unlike its claim. For this reason, He et al.'s scheme is insecure for practical application.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We review He et al.'s scheme in Section 2. The attacks on the He et al.'s scheme are presented in Section 3. Finally, we draw some conclusions in Section 4.
Review of He et al.'s Authentication Scheme
He et al.'s [5] scheme is composed for three phase: Registration phase, Login phase, and Authentication phase.
Registration phase
The server S generates two large prime numbers p and q such that p = 2q + 1. S generates a random number x ∈ Z * q as its secret key and selects a secure one-way hash function H(·). The following steps will be executed if a new user U i wants to be a legal user.
1. U i chooses his/her identity ID i and password P W i .
2. U i generates a random number r i ∈ Z * q .
3. U i sends ID i and H(P W i , r i ) to S through a secure channel.
S computes
5. S sends the authentication information {p, q, H(·), Y i } to U i through a secure channel.
6. U i stores it and r i locally on his/her memory device, i.e., his/her USB drive. Figure 1 illustrates the login and authentication procedures of the He et al.'s scheme. When U i wants to login in S, he/she will carry out the following steps:
Login phase
1. U i generates a random number α ∈ Z * q and computes
where T i is the current time of U i .
2. U i sends the login request message
3. If U i does not receive S's reply before timeout, U i must go back to the registration phase and re-obtain his/her authentication information.
Authentication phase
S and U i will authenticate each other and generate a common session key for their future communications through the following steps.
1. S checks the validity of ID i and freshness of T i . If ID i is not valid or T i is not fresh, S stops the session. Otherwise, S computes
and checks whether V i and H(ID i , C i , D i , T i ) are equal. If they are not equal, S stops the session; otherwise, S generates a random number β ∈ Z * q , computes
and sends the response message M 2 = {E i , V s , T s } to U i , where T s is the current time of S.
Upon receiving the message
If it is not fresh, U i stops the session; otherwise, U i checks whether V s and H(ID i , C i , D i , T i , E i , T s ) are equal. If they are not equal, U i stops the session; otherwise, S is authenticated.
3. After the mutual authentication finished, U i and S compute the session key
and use the key to launch a secure communication channel.
Impersonation Attack on He et al.'s Scheme
This section demonstrates that He et al.'s scheme [5] is still vulnerable to impersonation attack unlike its claim. Figure 2 illustrates the impersonation attack procedures on He et al.'s scheme. The details of these flaw are described as follows. Suppose an adversary Eve wants to impersonate a legal user U i to login in the server S. Let us assume that an attacker Eve has intercepted one of the U i 's past login request messages, i.e., M 1 = {ID i , C i , V i , T i }. Then Eve can perform the following impersonation attack:
1. Eve generates the current timestamp T Eve .
Eve lets
3. Eve computes
4. Eve sends the faked login request message
Upon receiving the faked login request message M Eve = {ID i , C * i , V * i , T Eve }, S will authenticate the adversary Eve by performing the following steps:
1. S will check the validity of ID i and freshness of T Eve .
2. Because ID i is valid and T i is fresh, S will compute
and then check whether V * i and H(ID i , C * i , D i , T Eve ) are equal. 3. Because they are always equal, S will generate a random number β ∈ Z * q , computes
and send the response message M 2 = {E i , V s , T s } to Eve.
4. Finally, S will compute a session key
Upon receiving the message M 2 = {E i , V s , T s }, Eve drops M 2 and computes the same session key sk = H(1)
Eve uses the session key to launch a secure communication channel. Therefore, He et al.'s authentication scheme is vulnerable to the above described impersonation attack. 
Conclusions
This paper reviewed He et al.'s improved password-based remote user authentication scheme without smart cards and then pointed out that He et al.'s scheme is still vulnerable to impersonation attack unlike its claim. For this reason, He et al.'s scheme is insecure for practical application. Further works will be focused on improving the He et al.'s scheme which can be able to provide greater security and to be more efficient than the existing authentication schemes by an accurate performance analysis.
